Venezuela’s vast natural wealth has once again entered Washington’s strategic calculations. Beyond oil, the country’s potential mineral resources are being framed as assets of national importance, even as experts warn that turning ambition into reality would be far more complex than political rhetoric suggests.
When Donald Trump announced that U.S. companies would be allowed to tap into Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, the spotlight swiftly broadened far beyond petroleum, and policy discussions increasingly began to encompass minerals, metals, and even rare earth elements thought to lie beneath Venezuelan territory, resources considered vital across sectors such as defense, aerospace, clean energy, and consumer technology, and now central to U.S. national security deliberations.
Yet while the idea of tapping Venezuela’s broader resource base may appear attractive on paper, specialists caution that it is fraught with uncertainty. The scale, quality and economic viability of many of these resources remain unclear, and the political, security and environmental obstacles surrounding extraction are formidable. As a result, most analysts agree that even an aggressive push by Washington would be unlikely to deliver meaningful relief to America’s strained supply chains in the near or medium term.
Broader strategic motivations extending well beyond oil
For decades, Venezuela has been synonymous with oil. Its proven crude reserves rank among the largest in the world, shaping its economy and its fraught relationship with the United States. However, recent geopolitical shifts have expanded the definition of “strategic resources” far beyond hydrocarbons. Critical minerals and rare earth elements are now seen as indispensable inputs for advanced manufacturing, renewable energy systems and military hardware.
Officials within the administration have signaled an awareness that Venezuela’s value may extend beyond petroleum. According to Reed Blakemore of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, there is recognition that the country may hold a wider array of natural assets. However, he and others emphasize that acknowledging potential is not the same as being able to exploit it.
The difficulties linked to mining and exporting minerals in Venezuela are, in many ways, even more formidable than those confronting the oil industry, since oil extraction benefits from existing infrastructure and well-established global markets, whereas developing the mineral sector would demand broad geological assessments, substantial financial commitments and enduring stability — requirements that Venezuela does not currently meet.
Ambiguity lurking beneath the surface
Years of political turmoil, economic decline and international isolation have left Venezuela with scarce trustworthy geological information, making any effort to develop its mineral resources extremely challenging. In contrast to nations that maintain transparent reporting systems and ongoing exploration, Venezuela’s underground assets remain only partially charted and are frequently described in uncertain, speculative terms.
The United States Geological Survey does not list Venezuela among countries with confirmed rare earth element reserves. This omission does not mean such resources are absent, but it underscores how little verified information exists. Experts believe Venezuela may host deposits of minerals such as coltan, a source of tantalum and niobium, as well as bauxite, which can yield aluminum and gallium. All of these metals are considered critical minerals by U.S. authorities.
Past Venezuelan leaders have made bold claims about these resources. In 2009, former president Hugo Chávez spoke publicly about large coltan discoveries, portraying them as a national treasure. Later, under Nicolás Maduro, the government established the Orinoco Mining Arc, a vast region designated for mineral exploration and extraction. In practice, however, the project became synonymous with environmental degradation, illegal mining and the presence of armed groups.
Security, governance, and environmental challenges
Mining is by nature a highly disruptive pursuit that depends on consistent governance, clear and enforceable rules, and assurances of long-term security. In Venezuela, such foundations are largely missing. Many areas thought to hold significant mineral reserves are isolated and poorly administered, leaving them exposed to unlawful activities.
Armed groups and criminal networks remain firmly embedded in illegal gold extraction in several regions of the country, as noted in numerous independent reports. With minimal oversight, these actors fuel violence, widespread deforestation and severe environmental contamination. Bringing in legitimate, large-scale mining operations under such conditions would be extremely challenging without sustained improvements in security and the enforcement of the rule of law.
Rare earth mining presents additional challenges. Extracting and processing these elements is energy-intensive and can generate hazardous waste if not properly managed. In countries with strict environmental standards, these risks translate into higher costs and longer project timelines. In Venezuela, where regulatory enforcement is weak, the environmental consequences could be severe, further complicating any attempt to attract responsible international investors.
As Blakemore has observed, even with favorable expectations, transporting Venezuelan minerals to international markets would prove a far tougher undertaking than developing oil. In the absence of reliable assurances on security, environmental safeguards, and consistent policies, only a handful of companies would consider investing the massive sums such initiatives demand.
China’s commanding role in processing and refining
Even if U.S. firms were able to overcome the hurdles of extraction, another bottleneck looms: processing. Mining raw materials is only the first step in the supply chain. For rare earths in particular, refining and separation are the most technically complex and capital-intensive stages.
Here, China maintains a powerful lead. The International Energy Agency reported that, in 2024, China was responsible for over 90% of the world’s refined rare earth output. This overwhelming position stems from decades of government backing, assertive industrial strategies and relatively relaxed environmental oversight.
As Joel Dodge of the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator has observed, China’s near-monopoly on processing confers both industrial and geopolitical leverage. Even if rare earths are mined elsewhere, they are often shipped to China for refining, reinforcing Beijing’s central role in the supply chain.
This situation adds complexity to Washington’s strategic planning, as gaining access to raw materials in Venezuela would hardly reduce reliance on China without concurrent investment in refining capacity at home or within allied nations, and such projects would take years to become operational while confronting their own regulatory and environmental obstacles.
Strategic importance of critical minerals for national security
The United States currently designates 60 minerals as “critical” due to their importance for economic and national security. This list includes metals such as aluminum, cobalt, copper, lead and nickel, as well as 15 rare earth elements like neodymium, dysprosium and samarium. These materials are embedded in everyday technologies, from smartphones and batteries to wind turbines and electric vehicles, and are also essential for advanced weapons systems.
Despite their name, rare earth elements are not particularly scarce in the Earth’s crust. As geographer Julie Klinger has explained, the difficulty lies not in their abundance but in the complexity of extracting and refining them in an economically and environmentally sustainable way. This distinction is often lost in political discourse, leading to exaggerated expectations about the strategic value of unproven deposits.
U.S. lawmakers have grown increasingly troubled by the nation’s dependence on overseas suppliers for these materials, especially as tensions with China escalate, and efforts have emerged to bolster mining and processing within the country. Yet these domestic initiatives encounter extended timelines, local resistance and rigorous environmental assessments, so rapid outcomes remain improbable.
Venezuela’s constrained influence in the coming years
Against this backdrop, hopes that Venezuela might become a major source of critical minerals seem unattainable, as experts at BloombergNEF and various research organizations highlight a mix of obstacles that sharply limit the nation’s outlook: geological information that is outdated or missing, insufficient qualified workers, pervasive organized crime, long-standing underinvestment and a policy landscape marked by volatility.
Sung Choi of BloombergNEF has argued that, despite Venezuela’s theoretical geological potential, it is unlikely to play a meaningful role in global critical mineral markets for at least the next decade. This assessment reflects not only the technical challenges of mining, but also the broader institutional weaknesses that deter long-term investment.
For the United States, this implies that efforts to broaden supply chain sources cannot treat Venezuela as an immediate remedy, since even with better diplomatic ties and relaxed sanctions, substantial structural obstacles would still pose significant challenges.
Geopolitical dynamics versus economic realities
The renewed focus on Venezuela’s resources illustrates a recurring tension in global economic policy: the gap between geopolitical aspiration and economic feasibility. From a strategic perspective, the idea of accessing untapped minerals in the Western Hemisphere is appealing. It aligns with efforts to reduce dependence on rival powers and to secure inputs vital for future industries.
However, the development of natural resources is shaped by unavoidable practical constraints, as mining endeavors depend on dependable institutions, clear regulatory frameworks and long-term commitments from both governments and companies, while also relying on local community acceptance and credible, robust environmental protections.
In Venezuela’s case, these foundations have been steadily weakened by decades of political upheaval, and restoring them would call for long-term reforms that reach far beyond what any single trade or energy initiative could achieve.
A sober assessment of expectations
Ultimately, experts urge caution in interpreting political statements about Venezuela’s resources. While the country’s underground wealth is often portrayed as vast and transformative, the evidence suggests a far more constrained outlook. Oil remains Venezuela’s most clearly defined asset, and even there, production faces significant obstacles.
Minerals and rare earth elements introduce added complexity, given uncertain reserves, costly extraction and global supply chains controlled by dominant actors. For the United States, obtaining these resources will probably hinge more on diversified sourcing, recycling, technological advances and strengthening domestic capacity than on pushing into new frontiers within politically volatile areas.
As the global race for critical minerals intensifies, Venezuela will continue to feature in strategic discussions. Yet without profound changes on the ground, its role is likely to remain marginal. Ambition alone cannot substitute for data, stability and infrastructure — the essential ingredients of any successful resource strategy.
